Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are crucial security mechanisms widely deployed for critical network protection. However, conventional IDSs become incompetent due to the rapid growth in network size and the sophistication of large scale a acks. To mitigate this problem, Collaborative IDSs (CIDSs) have been proposed in literature. In CIDSs, a number of IDSs exchange their intrusion alerts and other relevant data so as to achieve be er intrusion detection performance. Nevertheless, the required information exchange may result in privacy leakage, especially when these IDSs belong to di erent self-interested organizations. In order to obtain a quantitative understanding of the fundamental tradeo between the intrusion detection accuracy and the organizations' privacy, a repeated two-layer single-leader multi-follower game is proposed in this work. Based on our game-theoretic analysis, we are able to derive the expected behaviors of both the a acker and the IDSs and obtain the utility-privacy tradeo curve. In addition, the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) is proved and an asynchronous dynamic update algorithm is proposed to compute the optimal collaboration strategies of IDSs. Finally, simulation results are shown to validate the analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Considering that complete prevention of cyber-a acks is extremely di cult, if not impossible, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been introduced as an e ective second line of defense to minimize the damage caused by these a acks. However, conventional IDSs are not scalable to large networks due to the huge amount of tra c activities. In the meantime, the development of sophisticated largescale a acks renders the performance of an individual IDS rarely satisfactory. To mitigate this problem, Collaborative IDSs (CIDSs) have been proposed in literature (see, e.g., [7, 9] and the references therein).
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. A CIDS consists of a group of IDSs that monitor di erent (and possibly partially overlapped) sub-networks and jointly detect potential a acks. In such collaborative environments, IDSs are expected to exchange their intrusion alerts and other relevant data. Considering that some con dential information may be leaked in such information sharing procedure, some techniques have been proposed to protect the privacy in CIDSs [2, 4, 5, [10] [11] [12] , at the cost of utility loss (i.e., a detection performance degradation). However, there are two major limitations in these pioneering works. Firstly, it is o en di cult to quantify the amount of preserved privacy and utility loss in the existing methods. Secondly, the existing methods do not have the exibility of properly adjusting the collaboration strategies in response to a given privacy requirement.
In this work, a new privacy-preserving collaboration scheme is proposed for CIDS, which is amenable to the quantitative utilityprivacy tradeo analysis and exible in meeting the pre-speci ed privacy requirement. Considering the self-interestedness of the organizations and the intelligence of the a acker (a super a acker which combines the joint e orts of multiple distributed a ackers is assumed), a game-theoretic approach is taken in this work. More speci cally, the interaction among the a acker and the group of collaborative IDSs is modeled as a two-layer game. e rst-layer focuses on the interaction between the a acker and each individual IDS. Particularly, the in uence of the privacy requirement on the IDSs' responding strategies and the overall detection performance is explored, and based on which, the corresponding utility-privacy tradeo curve is obtained. e second-layer focuses on the interaction among IDSs themselves and based on which, the optimal collaboration strategies of the IDSs in di erent scenarios are derived.
e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the utility-privacy tradeo problem. e proposed twolayer game model is presented in Section 3. e proposed game is solved in Section 4 and the theoretical analysis is validated through simulations in Section 5. e limitations are discussed in Section 6. Conclusions and future works are presented in Section 7.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work, a network that consists of N di erent self-interested organizations (each having an IDS) is considered, denoted by N = {1, 2, ..., N }.
Attacker Model
A smart a acker that can infer the possible responding strategies of IDSs and choose its optimal a acking strategy accordingly is considered. It is assumed that the a acker can launch a acks on di erent organizations independently and the objective of the a acker is to a ack the target organizations in the network without being detected.
Furthermore, for the ease of presentation, it is assumed that the a acker will only launch one type of a ack (e.g., DDoS) on each organization. 1 If an IDS responds to the a acks (e.g., identify the a acker) successfully, the a acker would not a ack the corresponding organization again (in the time frame of interest) using the same type of a ack. is assumption makes sense because an a acker usually launches an a ack by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the system and once the a ack is detected and identi ed, the vulnerabilities will be xed and relevant signatures be recorded, which makes the same a ack ine ective. If the a acker switches to a new type of a ack, it is equivalent to start a new game in our model, which is hence not considered here for simplicity.
e action space of the a acker against each organization is U A = {u A 1 , u A 2 }, where u A 1 corresponds to "a ack" and u A 2 corresponds to "no a ack". e mixed strategy chosen by the a acker against organization i at time t is denoted by
are the probabilities that the a acker takes action u A 1 and u A 2 against organization i at time t, respectively.
Defender Model
For each IDS i, the objective is to respond to the a acks properly when the corresponding organization is under a ack. e action space of IDS i is U I = {u I 1 , u I 2 }, where u I 1 corresponds to "respond" and u I 2 corresponds to "do nothing". e mixed strategy chosen by IDS i is denoted by
2 ) are the probabilities that IDS i takes action u I 1 and u I 2 at time t, respectively.
In addition, it is assumed that when the a acker launches an a ack on an organization, the IDSs at di erent organizations will have correlated observations. is is a valid assumption for many realistic scenarios (e.g., the organizations and their IDSs are within the same network). In this paper, it is assumed that when the attacker launches an a ack on organization i, each IDS j will observe abnormal tra cs with probability q ji , and when the a acker does not launch any a ack on organization i, each IDS j will observe normal tra cs with probability q ji = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., N . For example, when the a acker launches DDoS a ack or spreads certain forms of malware, the unusual tra c ows generated by the a ack may be observed by the IDSs in the network with di erent probabilities, depending on their locations. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that q ji > 0.5, ∀j, i ∈ N . A er observing the tra cs, each IDS will independently run the intrusion detection algorithms and set an alert if intrusions are detected. Considering that an intrusion alert does not necessarily indicate intrusions due to the possible false alarm of the IDS, it needs to further decide whether to respond or not based on its own detection results as well as the detection results shared by others.
is work considers the scenario in which the IDSs in the network can collaborate for be er detection and response performance against the a acker. e incentive of collaboration lies in the fact 
Respond
Do nothing
that an organization will su er a potential loss if other organizations were taken down. For example, the malware injected in one organization may spread to other organizations due to the shared network environment. However, sharing the detection results may lead to potential privacy leakage for each IDS. For instance, if IDS i successfully detects an a ack on IDS j, it will realize that the a acker may launch the same a ack on itself and therefore be be er prepared for this type of a ack. By knowing the detection results, the a acker can infer the security state (e.g., whether the IDS knows the existence of the a ack) of the corresponding IDS and therefore choose a be er a acking strategy. Moreover, an intrusion alert usually contains some private information (e.g., IP address, processing time), which may raise big privacy concerns for the IDSs. As a result, the IDSs should also balance their utilities and privacy concerns so as to choose proper collaboration strategies.
General Settings
It is assumed that each organization i processes W i security asset, representing the loss of security when IDS i fails to successfully respond to the a acks [1] . In practice, the security assets of the organizations depend on their roles in the network and the data or information they hold. If IDS i fails to respond to the a acker successfully, the a acker gets a payo W i and IDS i gets a payo −W i . Otherwise, the payo s for the a acker and IDS i are −W i and W i , respectively. Table 1 illustrates the payo matrix of the a acker/IDS interaction on organization i, in which the rst entry and second entry in each cell denote the payo s of the a acker and the IDS, respectively. In the matrix, b i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the possibility of successful response for the IDS i; similar to [1] , the cost of a acking and responding are assumed to be proportional to the security asset of organization i, denoted by C a,i W i and C r,i W i , respectively, in which C a,i and C r,i denote the corresponding cost coe cients. When the a acker chooses to a ack and IDS i chooses to respond at the same time, the probability of successful response for IDS i is b i , which means IDS i will get payo W i −C r,i W i and −W i −C r,i W i with probability b i and 1 − b i , respectively. erefore, the payo of IDS i in expectation is −(1 − 2b i )W i − C r,i W i . Similarly, the payo of the a acker is (1 − 2b i )W i − C a,i W i . e payo s of both the a acker and IDS i in other cases are de ned similarly. Note that when the IDS chooses "do nothing", the payo of the a acker choosing "a ack" should be higher than that of choosing "no a ack" (otherwise, the a acker has no incentive to a ack), which indicates C a,i < 1. Similarly, C r,i < 1. 
COLLABORATIVE INTRUSION DETECTION GAME MODEL
In this section, the problem is modeled as a repeated two-layer single-leader multi-follower game, in which the a acker acts as the leader and the IDSs act as followers. e rst-layer game models the interaction between the a acker and each of the IDSs, respectively, while the second-layer game models the collaborative information sharing among the IDSs themselves. Figure 1 depicts a special case of the game model in which there are only two IDSs. More speci cally, the problem is solved in two steps: rst of all, the rstlayer game between the a acker and each IDS is solved, which determines the optimal payo s of both the a acker and IDSs as functions of the collaboration strategies of the IDSs. en, based on the payo functions from the rst-layer game, the IDSs further determine their optimal collaboration strategies given their privacy requirements in the second-layer game.
e First-layer Leader-follower Game
In the rst layer game, it is assumed that the follower plays a myopic best-response strategy to the leader's strategy at each time t [6] . Note that since it is not possible for the IDSs to know the future strategies of the a acker and the future detection results of themselves, the myopic strategy is actually the best strategy that an IDS can take.
3.1.1 The Followers' Problem. Given the a acker's strategy p A i,t and its own detection result Y i,t at time t (with Y i,t = 1 and Y i,t = 0 denoting alert and no alert, respectively), each IDS i rst estimates the probability that the a acker actually launches an a ack, which is given by
, for Y i,t = 1,
where p(Y i,t = 1|u A 1 ) is the probability that the detection result of IDS i at time t is Y i,t = 1 given that the a acker launches an a ack; p(Y i,t = 0|u A 1 ) is the probability that the detection result of IDS i at time t is Y i,t = 0 given that the a acker launches an a ack; p(Y i,t = 1) and p(Y i,t = 0) are the probabilities that the detection results of IDS i at time t are Y i,t = 1 and Y i,t = 0, respectively. ey are given by
in which q ii is the probability that IDS i observes an abnormal tra c pa ern when the a acker launches a acks on organization i; q ii is the probability that IDS i observes a normal tra c pa ern when the a acker does not launch any a ack on organization i; and p d i , p f p i denote the detection rate and the false positive rate of IDS i.
en, each IDS i nds its optimal strategy by solving the following optimization problem:
e payo function at
is the probability of the case that the a acker launches an a ack and IDS i chooses to respond given the detection result Y i,t , and
is the probability of the case that the a acker launches an a ack and IDS i chooses to do nothing given the detection result Y i,t , and −W i is the payo of IDS i in this case;
is the probability of the case that the a acker does not launch an a ack and IDS i chooses to respond given the detection result Y i,t , and −C r,i W i is the payo of IDS i in this case.
3.1.2 The Leader's Problem. As the a acker knows that the followers will choose their strategies to maximize their corresponding payo s, it will choose the strategy that maximizes its own payo . However, since the a acker does not know the detection results of IDS i, it has to maximize the expected payo corresponding to the distribution p(Y i,t ) which can be obtained by (4) and (5) given its chosen strategy. As a result, the a acker nds its optimal strategy against IDS i by solving the following optimization problem:
whereT i e is the time when IDS i successfully responds to the a acker and
is the probability of the case that the a acker launches an a ack and IDS i chooses to do nothing given the detection result Y i,t = j and W i − C a,i W i is the payo of the a acker in this case;
is the probability of the case that the a acker launches an a ack and IDS i chooses to respond given the detection result Y i,t = j and (1 − 2b i − C a,i )W i is the payo of the a acker in this case.
Collaborative IDS Case.
In the previous subsections, it is assumed that each IDS works independently. In practice, however, the IDSs can share their detection results Y i,t 's with others so as to help improve the performance of other IDSs, which will in return enhance the security of the whole network. However, sharing these detection results will lead to the risk of private information leakage (e.g., security state). As a result, each IDS i is assumed to share an obfuscated version of Y i,t with others, denoted byŶ i,t . In this work, it is assumed that each IDS i will misreport its true detection result to other IDSs with probability p c i,t and the preserved privacy is measured by the entropy introduced by p c i,t [3] , given as follows:
In this case, each IDS i nds its optimal strategy by solving the following modi ed optimization problem:
whereŶ −i,t denotes the obfuscated detection results shared by other IDSs at time t, and
where Q i (u A 1 |Y i,t ,Ŷ −i,t ) could be obtained similarly as in the noncollaboration case.
e Second-layer Game
e second layer game models the interaction among the IDSs themselves. In this game, an action of each IDS i is a probability p c i,t ∈ [c i , 0.5] 2 with which the IDS i would send out wrong detection results in order to protect its own privacy, and c i depends on the privacy policy of each organization. e utility function of each IDS i is given as follows:
where
is a vector which denotes the misreport probabilities of all the IDSs; p c −i,t denotes the misreport probabilities of all the IDSs other than IDS i; R est i,t (p c t ) denotes the estimated payo of IDS i given p c t , which will be discussed in Section 4; R est i,t (p c −j,t , p c j,t = 0.5) denotes the estimated reward of IDS i when IDS j randomly reports its detection result (i.e., p c j,t = 0.5), and therefore R est i,t (p c t ) − R est i,t (p c −j,t , p c j,t = 0.5) measures IDS i's estimated payo improvement due to the shared detection result 2 In this work, it is assumed that the misreporting probabilities are common knowledge for all the IDSs. erefore, it is equivalent for an IDS to misreport with probability p c i, t or 1 − p c i, t . from IDS j; β i, j and λ i are constants that measure the importance of payo improvement and privacy loss, respectively. e privacy loss P L (p c i,t ) is given by
where H (p c i ) denotes the entropy introduce by p c i,t . As a result, each IDS i has to solve the following optimization problem: 
SOLVING THE GAME
Note that the optimal strategies of both the a acker and the IDSs have the same expressions at di erent time slots. erefore, the subscript t will be omi ed in this section for the ease of presentation. In this work, we focus on the scenario where p d i > 0.5 and p f p i < 0.5 for all i without loss of generality.
e First-layer Leader-follower Game
e leader-follower game is o en solved by backward induction. First, solve the follower's problem for every possible strategy taken by the leader.
e solution consists of the best response strategy of the follower as a function of the leader's strategy.
en, the leader decides its optimal strategy according to the followers' best responses. e obtained solution is o en referred to as a Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) [8] .
4.1.1 Non-collaborative IDS Case. In this case, by performing backward induction, the best response of IDS i can be solved as
Combing the payo function of the a acker, the SNE of the a acker and IDS i can be obtained as follows:
. p I i, * (u I 1 ) = 0. R 1. e SNE obtained above is a weak equilibrium since when
, for any p I i (u I 1 ) ∈ [0, 1], IDS i will receive the same payo . To push IDS i to choose its desired strategy (i.e., p I i, * (u I 1 ) = 0), the a acker will set
where ϵ is a small positive number. In this case, the corresponding payo is only slightly less than the desired SNE obtained above when ϵ is su ciently small, which is acceptable for the a acker. For the ease of discussion, ϵ is set to be 0 in the following analysis, but the results obtained still hold when ϵ > 0, as long as it is su ciently small. R 2. At the SNE obtained above, the optimal strategy of IDS i is to respond with probability p I i, * (u I 1 ) = 0. is is because the a acker is modeled as the leader in the game and thus can take the advantage and choose a strategy to force the IDS not to respond. Nonetheless, since both p(Y i = 1|u A 2 ) and p(Y i = 1|u A 1 ) are functions of p d i and p f p i which measure the detecting capability of IDS i, the existence of IDS renders the a acker to choose a low a acking probability. e corresponding payo s of the a acker and IDS i at the above SNE are given as follows:
W i .
Collaborative IDS Case.
Again, by performing backward induction, the best response of IDS i can be solved as
i, * (u I 1 ) = 0. e corresponding payo s of the a acker and IDS i at the above SNE are given as follows:
.
Note that in this case, p(
2 ) are functions of misreporting probabilities p c j , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }∩ {j i}, and when p c j = 0.5, ∀j, the optimal strategies of both the a acker and IDS i agree with those of the non-collaborative IDS case, respectively. P
1. e collaboration scheme (i.e., IDS j sharesŶ j with IDS i) will always give a be er payo for IDS i, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
e Second-layer Game
Given the payo functions of the IDSs in both non-collaborative and collaborative cases for all possible collaboration strategies, the payo at SNE is used as the estimate, and hence R est i (p c ) = U I ,c i, * (p c ), and then the utility function of IDS i is given by
In addition, the action set of IDS i is given by A i = {p c i |c i p c i 0.5}. Given the utility function and the action set of all the IDSs, we can prove that the second-layer game admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) in certain conditions. P 2. e second layer game admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategy when the following condition holds: 3 3 Note that this condition always hold when the network is large enough, i.e., N → ∞.
Note that the concavity of the utility function makes problem (15) a convex optimization problem, which is easy to solve numerically. Suppose that all the IDSs solve the corresponding convex optimization problems asynchronously and broadcast their collaboration strategies using their own timescale. Let T i u denote the set of times that IDS i update its misreport probability, and assume that these sets are in nite for all the IDSs (i.e., all the IDSs will update in nitely o en), an asynchronous dynamic update algorithm is proposed to compute the NE of the second layer game as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Asynchronous Dynamic Update Algorithm
Initialization: set t = 0, p c i = 0 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N repeat for all t = 0, 1, ..., N do if t ∈ T i u then IDS i solves the convex optimization problem and updates p c i (t). 
NUMERICAL STUDY
In this section, numerical study is performed to validate the analytical results.
Utility-privacy Tradeo
In this subsection, we consider a network consisting of N target systems protected by N corresponding IDSs, and it is assumed that all of them have high security requirements. In such a scenario, the IDSs would have more powerful response capability and the cost of response is considered to be small (i.e., b i is large and C r,i is small, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }). Considering these, we set C a,i = C r,i = 0.1,
In addition, it is assumed that when the a acker launches an a ack on organization i, IDS i will observe abnormal tra c with probability q ii = 1, while the other IDS j will observe abnormal tra c with probability q ji = 0.8, ∀j i. Figure 2 shows the tradeo between the average payo improvement (i.e., the di erence of the utility of the collaborative scheme and that of the non-collaborative one in of the rst-layer game) and the preserved privacy (i.e., 1 − P L (p c i )) of all the IDSs. It can be seen that in all the examined scenarios, the collaborative scheme always enhances the performance, which justi es Proposition 1. In addition, the payo improvement achieves its highest value when the preserved privacy is 0 (i.e., all the IDSs share their detecting results with others honestly) and the payo improvement vanishes to 0 when the preserved privacy a ains 1 (i.e., all the IDSs randomly send out their detection results with probability 0.5). Furthermore, when the number of collaborative IDSs increases, the IDSs can reserve more privacy while achieving the same the payo improvement. Intuitively, when there are more collaborative IDSs, an IDS can gather more information about whether the a acker has launched an a ack or not, given all the shared detection results. As a result, once the a acker launches an a ack, the probability of being detected and triggering the IDSs to respond is higher, which in turn decreases the a acker's a acking probability.
Collaboration Strategies
In this subsection, the optimal collaboration strategies of IDSs in the two collaborative IDSs case are examined (similar results are observed for the cases of N > 2). e parameter β i, j is chosen to be [U Figure 3 shows how λ 1 will in uence the collaboration strategies of both IDSs. In our model, λ 1 determines how important privacy is for IDS 1, and is thus closely related to its privacy requirement. It can be seen that with di erent λ 1 , not only the misreport probability of IDS 1 changes but also that of IDS 2. More speci cally, when λ 1 becomes larger, both IDSs would collaborate with higher misreport probability. is may be explained as follows: a larger λ 1 implies that IDS 1 emphasizes more on privacy, and hence it would prefer to increase its misreport probability. In the meantime, a higher misreport probability of IDS 1 also decreases IDS 2's willingness to collaborate. As a result, IDS 2 will increase its misreport probability in response.
In addition, it is worth mentioning that for di erent privacy requirements (i.e., di erent λ 1 and λ 2 ), our model is able to guide the IDSs in nding optimal collaboration strategies that can achieve a suitable balance between utility and privacy.
LIMITATIONS
In this work, it is assumed that the collaborative IDSs are all trustworthy, that is, they will report their misreport probabilities honestly. In real scenarios, however, some sel sh IDSs may break the rule by sending out wrong misreport probabilities in order to be er protect their own privacy. Even worse, when there are some compromised IDSs in the network, they may broadcast wrong detection results to mislead others, and therefore threaten the e ective collaboration. In these cases, the performance of the proposed approach may degrade.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this work, the utility-privacy tradeo problem in CIDSs is formulated as a repeated two-layer single-leader multi-follower game which ends once the IDSs respond to the a acker successfully. By solving the rst layer leader-follower game, the utility-privacy tradeo curve for given collaboration strategies depending on the privacy policies of di erent organizations is obtained. By solving the second layer game, the collaborative strategies for the IDSs at NE can be computed. In addition, the existence of NE of the second-layer game is proved and an asynchronous dynamic update algorithm is developed to compute the NE. Further extending this work to dynamic se ings or multiple possible a acks se ings constitute interesting future directions.
